




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Emotion, Cognition, and the Value of Literature: The Case of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*

ANTONY AUMANN

ABSTRACT: One striking feature of *On the Genealogy of Morals* is how it is written. Nietzsche employs a literary style that provokes his readers' emotions. In *Beyond Selflessness*, Christopher Janaway argues that such a literary approach is integral to Nietzsche's philosophical goals. Feeling the emotions Nietzsche's style arouses is *necessary* for understanding the views he defends. I argue that Janaway's position is mistaken. The evidence at our disposal fails to establish that emotion is ever necessary for cognition. However, I maintain that we do have good evidence for a slightly weaker claim. The emotionally sensitive person is epistemically better off than the cold and dispassionate person. There are some truths he or she will be more likely to believe and will have better reasons for believing. I conclude that Janaway is right to defend the philosophical importance of Nietzsche's literary writing style. His error is simply that he overstates the case.

KEYWORDS: Nietzsche, style, emotion, cognition, literary value

Nietzsche, Janaway, and a Heightened Version of Plato's Challenge

Near the end of the *Republic*, Plato challenges defenders of poetry to explain how it "not only gives pleasure but is beneficial . . . to human life."¹ We sometimes hear a heightened version of this demand. Partisans not just of poetry but also of literature in general are asked to establish that the arts they celebrate possess a *distinctive* or *unique* value. In other words, they must show that poetry and literature are *irreplaceable* and that we would lose some great good were they banished from the scene.² As with Plato's original challenge, the more radical version is often met on cognitive grounds. It is said that poetry and literature can convey knowledge and insight that could not otherwise be conveyed. They can teach us truths that could not be taught through the ordinary prose works of philosophy, psychology, sociology and the like.³

In *Beyond Selflessness*, Christopher Janaway depicts Nietzsche's *GM* as an example of a literary text that possesses precisely this kind of indispensable cognitive value. Janaway's argument has two parts. He begins with a claim that

Plato might well concede. Unlike stereotypical academic prose, Nietzsche's literary writing style arouses our emotions. But rather than going on to say, as Plato sometimes does, that our emotions *interfere* with the knowledge acquisition process, Janaway pushes the opposite point. Feeling the emotions Nietzsche's style evokes is *necessary* for understanding the truths Nietzsche wishes to convey.⁴

Janaway's argument is provocative, intriguing, and in broad strokes quite popular.⁵ I aim to show that it is also unconvincing. In particular, the second part of the argument lacks adequate support. The evidence at our disposal fails to establish that emotion is ever necessary for cognition, at least when it comes to propositional truth. However, I will maintain that we do have reason to believe a slightly weaker claim in the same general neighborhood. The emotionally sensitive person—i.e., the one who consults his or her emotions—is epistemically better off than the cold and dispassionate person. There are some truths he or she will not just be more likely to believe but will have better reasons for believing.

I will conclude that Janaway is right to defend the cognitive value of the emotions and, by extension, the cognitive value of a literary writing style such as Nietzsche's. Thus, he meets Plato's original challenge. My objection is that Janaway does not meet the heightened version of this challenge. He does not establish that literature is necessary or indispensable for realizing some great good.

Lessons from Nussbaum

Janaway focuses on the specific case of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*. But we can interpret him as engaged in a more generic project. He seeks to establish that some works of literature can teach us things more traditional academic works cannot. Not only does this project have broad appeal, but Janaway's way of going about it is quite common.⁶ Perhaps the best-known statement of the strategy he employs occurs in Martha Nussbaum's writings. Two insights she defends in *Love's Knowledge* bring us to the nub of the issue.

Nussbaum's first insight is that the kind of prose we typically encounter in academic work, especially in philosophical books and articles, addresses only our intellects. It does not speak to us on an emotional level, as poetry and literature so often do.⁷ This state of affairs, Nussbaum claims, reflects the deep but often unacknowledged influence of certain theoretical commitments held by Plato (at least in some of the dialogues) and, in the modern era, Locke. Both thinkers saw emotion as having pernicious effects on our philosophical judgment. They held that feelings, affects, and moods distort our evaluation of evidence and lead to prejudice in our assessment of arguments. Thus, they counseled that any writing intended for the purpose of instruction should rid itself of emotive language.

The following passage from Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* captures the spirit of their view:

But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow, that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence has invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong *ideas*, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them.⁸

According to Nussbaum, the legacy of Locke's policy recommendation is the virtual absence of literary and poetic elements in most academic prose today, which proceeds instead in an abstract, impersonal, and above all dispassionate manner.

Nussbaum's second insight is that the adequacy of this kind of academic prose for imparting knowledge depends on the accuracy of Plato and Locke's view of the emotions.⁹ If their position is correct, and our emotions only *inhibit* our attempts to acquire knowledge, then stereotypical academic writing will suffice. If Plato and Locke err, a different conclusion follows. Precisely what this conclusion is depends on how far wrong they go. Two possibilities deserve mention.

1. It may well be that sometimes our emotions do not inhibit understanding but instead aid it.

On this view, academic prose will not always be the most effective means for accomplishing our communicative goals. In some cases, we will be better off using a literary or poetic style of writing that speaks to our readers' emotions.

2. It may well be that sometimes our emotions do not merely aid understanding but actually enable it.

If this second position is correct, academic prose will at times be inadequate for imparting knowledge. Conveying information will require activating faculties that academic prose does not address. To achieve our communicative ends, we will have to turn to literature or poetry, such being the forms of writing suited to rousing the emotions.¹⁰

In this way, Nussbaum carves out a strategy for defending the indispensable cognitive value of literature. One need only prove that the second of these two views is correct, that is, one need only establish that emotion is sometimes necessary for cognition. As we will see, this is how Janaway proceeds.

The Role of Emotion in Nietzsche's Perspectivism

Janaway's version of the argument builds on Nietzsche's perspectival view of knowledge. Janaway endorses a popular interpretation of this doctrine put forth by Brian Leiter. According to Leiter, when Nietzsche declares that all knowing

is perspectival (*GM* III:12),¹¹ he means that our understanding of any particular topic is always somewhat one-sided. We grasp only some of the truths about it, not all of them. In other words, our focus is always selective. We attend to certain parts of the subject into which we are inquiring, but overlook others.¹²

The relevance of Nietzsche's perspectivism becomes clear when we ask what factors might determine the focus of our mental attention. Scholarly responses vary here. Leiter holds that our practical interests and goals do the work.¹³ Maudemarie Clark suggests that our background beliefs and cognitive capacities are partly responsible.¹⁴ Janaway provides yet another answer. He claims that our affects—which he takes to include our feelings, moods, and emotions—can also direct our attention.¹⁵

I find Janaway's view attractive. It is a defensible interpretation of Nietzsche and a good account of how things go in the world. In fact, what Janaway says accords well with recent empirical research on the relationship between emotion and cognition. One important finding in this area is that both positive and negative emotions influence the data selection process.¹⁶ They help determine which incoming stimuli we select as appropriate for further consideration. In addition, they affect how we interpret these stimuli—how we categorize and classify them—and what sort of additional cognitive resources we devote to them.

This Nietzschean idea about the relationship between emotion and cognition has been further developed by Noël Carroll and Jenefer Robinson.¹⁷ They maintain that our emotions perform at least three cognitive functions. First, our emotions make some aspects of our experience more salient than other aspects. They bring things from the margins of consciousness to its center. Second, our emotions organize our perception and conception of the world, framing them in terms of a particular *gestalt* or whole. (Robinson speaks here of viewing the world through an emotional lens.)¹⁸ Finally, our emotions prime us to be on the lookout for the emergence of considerations that will confirm or fill out this *gestalt* or whole.

Janaway provides several examples of how our emotions play these roles. One of the more telling examples concerns the passage in *GM* in which Nietzsche describes the journey of Mr. Rash and Curious into the workshop where Judeo-Christian ideals are made (*GM* I:14).¹⁹ The workshop comes across as something out of a horror movie. It is dark, lit only by a "false iridescent light." Mr. Rash and Curious can see next to nothing. Soft muttering and whispering arise from "cellar rodents" huddled together in hidden nooks and crannies. The smells are awful. The noxious air forces Mr. Rash and Curious to pinch his nose.

On an affective level, the scene evokes a sense of unease or even fear, as well as a slight feeling of disgust. These emotional responses prompt us to consider the secrets of the workshop from a certain perspective. They lead us to attend to what is unnerving about the Judeo-Christian values that Mr. Rash and Curious investigates. Thus, as we read about his terrifying discovery that these values

are the product of lies and deception, it strikes a chord: “Now [the inventors of Judeo-Christian morality] give me to understand that they are not merely better than the mighty, the lords of the earth whose spittle they have to lick (*not* from fear, not at all from fear! but because God has commanded them to obey the authorities)—that they are not merely better but are also ‘better off,’ or at least will be better off someday. But enough! enough! I can’t take any more. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop where *ideals are manufactured*—it seems to me it stinks of so many lies” (*GM*I:14).

This first example captures an obvious way in which our emotions help us to understand the content of *GM*. However, our emotions also provide more subtle assistance. A second example discussed by Janaway illustrates the point. As we explore Nietzsche’s account of the slaves’ behavior, we experience something besides disgust and revulsion. Admiration mixes with these negative feelings.²⁰ This more positive emotional reaction toward the slaves constitutes an important piece of data, one we must take into account in our interpretation of Nietzsche’s text. Our struggle to accommodate it leads us to wonder what the slaves might be doing that gives rise to our esteem. We eventually come to realize that, despite their hypocrisy, the slaves are remarkably clever. Gaining revenge by inverting their oppressors’ value system is an ingenious strategy. In this way, our emotions help augment our grasp of Nietzsche’s take on slave morality.²¹

Emotions as Tools of Discovery

We can now see how our emotions play a role in the knowledge acquisition process. We can appreciate how they help us to understand what Nietzsche aims to convey in *GM*. These points are important—and underappreciated. Yet, they fail to get us where we need to go. The pivotal question is not whether our emotions ever play *a* role in the knowledge acquisition process, but whether they ever play a *necessary* role. In other words, do they enable us to grasp truths we could not otherwise grasp? Like many other scholars, Janaway answers this question in the affirmative.²² I find his response tempting but mistaken. The temptation arises because we have reason to believe a position confusingly close to the one they adopt. The position is worth exploring in some depth.

Supporters of the cognitive value of the emotions sometimes point out that dispassionate people, as well as those whose emotional faculties are somehow disabled, struggle to solve certain problems. For example, Robinson cites empirical research done by Antonio Damasio showing that people who lack emotional intelligence have trouble figuring out how to respond appropriately in social situations.²³ Similarly, on Janaway’s interpretation of Nietzsche, Paul Rée fails to come up with the correct explanation for the origin of punishment because he does not consult his emotions on the matter.²⁴

We must be careful about what follows from this evidence. Notice that the people referred to in the cases under discussion are depending only on their own cognitive abilities and resources. They are attempting to interpret data and solve problems autonomously, that is, without relying on the assistance of others. Rée is striving to go beyond the work of other philosophers and make his own original contribution to the field. The individuals in Damasio's studies are attempting to make decisions for themselves about matters of social importance. It remains an open question whether any of these people could figure out the problems they face if outside assistance were provided. If straightforwardly told the solutions they need, for instance, would they understand them? Or would they remain befuddled?

This consideration limits what conclusion we can legitimately draw from the evidence under discussion. It may show that feeling emotions is indispensable *for arriving at certain truths on one's own*. But it does not prove that feeling emotions is necessary *for understanding those truths*.²⁵ An analogy helps here. It is consistent with the evidence provided by the cases in question that our emotions function as telescopes do, namely as "tools of discovery." A telescope brings things into focus that we otherwise could not see. However, we can convey the truths it reveals, for example, that a planet exists in some distant solar system, to those who lack access to a telescope or who are not currently consulting theirs. Thus, learning these truths does not *require* gazing through a telescope. Applying the analogy, there may be truths none of us would know unless one of us consulted his or her emotions. But it does not follow that each of us must consult his or her emotions in order to understand these truths. We could learn about them from others, provided the chain of testimony eventually stretched back to an emotionally attuned individual.

The notion that our emotions are merely tools of discovery is not just an idle possibility Janaway must rule out. At least when reading *On the Genealogy of Morals*, our emotions appear to function in precisely that way. We can garner support for this claim by returning to Janaway's examples. In the first example, the disgust we experience while reading Nietzsche's description of the "workshop where ideals are made" brings into focus the negative aspects of what transpires there. It leads us to attend to the fact that the values created in the workshop are the product of dishonesty. However, this fact is something that can be communicated to people without first arousing their emotions. Indeed, Janaway does it in his commentary. In the second example, I explained how our surprising admiration for the slaves prompts us to reflect on why such a feeling might overcome us. We eventually realize that the slaves possess subtle positive attributes in addition to their more obvious negative ones. In particular, they display astonishing creativity in their attempts to revenge themselves against their masters. However, once again, the information that our emotions help us to understand can be communicated in a perfectly straightforward fashion.

Thus, the challenge facing Janaway, or the defender of the Janaway-type view, is to show that our emotions are not merely tools of discovery. Such an account undersells their cognitive power. Our emotions actually enable us to grasp truths we could learn in no other way. In what follows, I will examine how Janaway tries to establish this point.

Emotions and Psychological Hang-ups

I said earlier that our emotions can lead us to view the world in a particular way and direct our attention toward considerations that support this view. One idea Janaway impresses upon us in *Beyond Selflessness* is that there is another side to this story. Our emotions can also *inhibit* us from attending to factors that would *disconfirm* or require us to *reverse* our judgments about the world. For example, a positive affective appraisal of a beloved family member can make it difficult to grasp unflattering truths about him or her. Similarly, harboring negative feelings toward ourselves can make it hard to see what we do well.

So much is fairly banal. Of greater interest is the fact that we encounter on occasion an extreme version of this phenomenon. Our affects at times actually *prevent* us from attending to certain information. When our emotions create cognitive blind spots in this way, straightforwardly telling us what we are missing is not going to work. We will misinterpret or ignore what is being said. To return to my examples, our passion for our beloved can become so ferocious that it renders us completely unable to process other people's insights into his or her flaws. Our self-loathing can become so severe that the honest and accurate compliments of others simply do not register. Getting us to acknowledge the truth in these situations will require getting us to revise our emotional attachments. This in turn will call for a style of communication that addresses us on an emotional level. Ordinary prose, especially of the stereotypical academic sort, is not suited to this task. Literature and poetry are.

Janaway maintains that Nietzsche sees himself as addressing an audience that is emotionally blinded in the manner just described.²⁶ We, Nietzsche's readers, are deeply wed to Judeo-Christian values. These emotional bonds make us resistant to truly hearing the criticisms of altruism, compassion, and self-denial Nietzsche has to offer. Indeed, we are liable to distort or dismiss his objections. To get his message across, Nietzsche must first deal with these underlying emotional attachments. He must first reorient our feelings toward selflessness so that we no longer find it so attractive.²⁷ Ideally, he will get us to find it disgusting and repulsive.²⁸ Indeed, this is the function of Nietzsche's literary writing style. It arouses the negative affective responses toward Judeo-Christian values that enable us to get past our hang-ups and grasp the truths about it that he wishes to convey.

This argument suffers from two problems. First, the need for emotional arousal does not stem from the *content* of *GM* per se. It stems rather from

certain psychological facts about the book's intended *audience*. If Nietzsche were dealing with a different audience, one possessed of a different psychological makeup, presenting his message in ordinary prose would be unproblematic. The upshot is that, strictly speaking, the argument does not give us reason to think there is some truth only literature or poetry can convey. It does not prove *sans phrase* that the literary style of *GM* enables it to communicate some bit of knowledge it could not communicate were it written in ordinary prose. Defenders of Janaway's view might retort that the line of thought he defends nonetheless establishes the irreplaceable cognitive value of literature *in some situations*. It shows that we must make use of a literary mode of discourse when our target audience is strongly emotionally predisposed against our message. This situation arises frequently enough to make the point worthy of note.

However, a second objection undercuts this fallback position. Notice how Janaway's argument separates the ultimate cognitive payoff of Nietzsche's literary writing style from its more immediate emotive function. The literary aspects of *GM* serve to arouse our emotions. But these emotions do not themselves disclose the truths Nietzsche wants us to know. Instead they enable us to overcome psychological obstacles that inhibit us from grasping these truths. This setup renders the literary aspects of *GM* vulnerable to the threat of replaceability. If we had other tools to combat the relevant psychological impediments, we could convey Nietzsche's message to everyone, including people emotionally predisposed to ignore them, without resorting to the literary arts. As it turns out, we do in principle possess alternative means, namely the right drugs or the right psychotherapy. Therefore, even if Janaway's argument is supposed to establish the irreplaceable cognitive value of literature only in some cases, it cannot shoulder its burden.

Emotion and Self-Knowledge

To avoid the sort of problems just described, Janaway must establish the existence of a tighter connection between emotion and cognition. It is not enough for him to show that feeling the proper emotions is necessary for overcoming psychological obstacles to grasping the truth. He must prove that, at least sometimes, emotion is part and parcel of the cognition process, an integral component of the mechanism by which we understand certain ideas.²⁹ At various places in *Beyond Selflessness*, Janaway claims to identify cases in which emotion is bound up with cognition in precisely this way.³⁰ His most compelling example has to do with self-knowledge. More precisely, it has to do with a situation in which the truth to be grasped concerns the knower's own emotional states. Filling out the example requires explaining Janaway's interpretation of *GM*.

On the standard view, *On the Genealogy of Morals* contains a theory about the origin of Judeo-Christian values, one in which emotion plays a central role.

For instance, in the first essay, Nietzsche describes how slaves and other downtrodden people of the distant past felt deep hatred toward their oppressors. Owing to their lack of power, however, they could not gain a physical revenge. So, their resentment festered. Eventually, they hit upon the idea of launching a psychological attack: They inverted their masters' value system. They assigned negative values to the things that members of the dominant class embodied and praised. Power and pride became vices, poverty and humility became virtues. As a result, the slaves were able to see their masters as morally deviant human beings, and thus acquire a kind of victory over them.

Janaway accepts this interpretation, but adds a layer of complexity. As he sees it, Nietzsche's theory is not merely about oppressed people from bygone times. It is about *us, today*. It is about how *we* have come to embrace Judeo-Christian values, and how *our* emotions have been the driving force.³¹ We too feel resentment toward those who wield power over us. And we too avenge ourselves by denigrating the character traits of the strong and dominant. According to Janaway, it is this last point that dispassionate readers of *GM* will not get.³² They will fail to grasp how the book is really about them—about how their emotions are driving their value judgments. Thus, they will fail to acquire the kind of self-knowledge Nietzsche hopes to inculcate.

To make his case, Janaway points out that, by definition, dispassionate people ignore or suppress any emotions they currently have. They adopt a perspective that involves relegating such matters to the background or pushing them below the level of conscious awareness. In so doing, however, they remove their attention from considerations that occupy a central place in Nietzsche's theory (namely, their emotions). This cognitive blind spot prevents them from fully comprehending *GM*. As Janaway puts the point, dispassionate readers cannot understand what Nietzsche is talking about because they cannot "identify" or "locate" in themselves the emotions Nietzsche insists are there.³³ This fact reveals why Nietzsche must use a writing style that arouses his readers' emotions or, more precisely, brings their emotions back to the forefront of their minds. He needs to ensure that his readers attend to the crucial aspects of his theory.

Much of what Janaway says here is accurate and insightful. But there is a problem. The same line of reasoning that shows that dispassionate readers will not understand the literary *GM* can also be used to show that they will not understand Janaway's rather straightforward commentary. This is a counterintuitive result. Let me explain.

Despite his praise for Nietzsche's poetic style, Janaway writes in a stereotypical academic fashion. His prose is dispassionate, impersonal, and generally devoid of literary trappings. Accordingly, when we read his book, it engages us on a purely intellectual level. It does not arouse our emotions. Janaway says many things in this scholarly voice. Most notably, he explains how Nietzsche's story is really about us—about how our emotions drive our

value systems. For instance, he says, “our current moral concepts are *ex post facto* rationalizations of our . . . inherited feelings” and “we have inherited an affective allegiance to what counted as good in the conceptual scheme of slave morality.”³⁴ If Janaway’s account of the relationship between emotion and cognition were entirely correct, these lines should be hard for us to comprehend. His writing style should render us cold and dispassionate. It should lead us to ignore our own emotional states. Consequently, we should be unable to locate or identify the emotions he is talking about in the quoted passage. And so we should be confused or perplexed by what he is trying to say.

However, that is not what happens. Our attempts to grasp the meaning of the lines from Janaway’s commentary do not encounter serious difficulties. Indeed, no matter how dispassionately we proceed, it is fairly easy to comprehend what he says. Thus, although there is something right about Janaway’s analysis of dispassionate readers, his claim that they cannot understand truths about their own emotions appears wrongheaded.

The Epistemic Advantage of Being Emotional

We can rescue the spirit of Janaway’s position by slightly altering it. We can jettison the strong claim that dispassionate people will fail to *understand* theories and statements that refer to their own current emotions. In its place, we can insert the weaker claim that dispassionate people will not *believe* such theories and statements.³⁵ The idea here is that dispassionate readers of *GM* occupy an epistemically impoverished standpoint. Although they can comprehend what Nietzsche says, they lack access to pivotal evidence that would support his claims. As a result, they find it reasonable to reject or to withhold assent from his position.

Initially, we might wonder what dispassionate readers of *On the Genealogy of Morals* cannot see or what piece of evidence they do not have. However, Janaway has already provided us with a plausible answer. Unlike their more emotionally attuned peers, dispassionate readers cannot identify or locate in themselves the emotions Nietzsche says are there, namely the emotions that are driving their moral commitments.³⁶

Although *prima facie* attractive, this weaker version of Janaway’s position still encounters a problem. The failure of dispassionate people to see the relevant emotions in themselves does not furnish them with a sufficient reason to reject Nietzsche’s claim that these emotions exist. For an inability to detect an emotion in oneself does not entail its absence. Such an inference overestimates our introspective powers. Indeed, it assumes the complete transparency of the mental realm. Nietzsche warns against such a view (*GMP*:1; *D* 119). Within many of us, there are emotions at work that do not rise to the level of conscious awareness.

Even though the emotional blindness of dispassionate people does not entitle them to *dismiss* Nietzsche's claims, it might justify them in *withholding assent*. For it might leave them without a sufficient reason to believe what Nietzsche says. However, this too is unconvincing. Even though dispassionate readers of *GM* cannot detect in themselves the emotions Nietzsche says are there, they could endorse his claim that they are present on other grounds. They could accept it on Nietzsche's authority as an astute psychologist. Alternatively, they could accept it on the basis of induction. They could realize that his theory has explanatory power when it comes to other people's moral commitments and then generalize to themselves.

Nevertheless, the weaker version of Janaway's position makes an important point. Emotionally sensitive people *are* epistemically better off than dispassionate people in one respect. Consciously feeling the emotions Nietzsche insists are present within us provides us with a powerful piece of evidence in favor of his theory. When we empathize with the slaves gnashing their teeth at those who exercise unfettered power over them, or when we experience waves of resentment toward the beasts of prey in our own lives, our estimation of Nietzsche's position increases. It becomes more plausible to us that our emotions often drive our value judgments.

In conclusion, Janaway is right to defend the cognitive value of the emotions and, by extension, the cognitive value of Nietzsche's literary writing style. Thus, he meets Plato's original challenge. He shows that literature is useful. In particular, it is useful for communicating truths that have to do with our emotions. The problem is simply that Janaway falls short of meeting the heightened version of Plato's challenge. The arguments he develops do not provide adequate support for the claim that literature is necessary or indispensable for conveying the truths that Nietzsche wishes to convey.

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NOTES

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1. Plato, *Republic*, trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 607d.

2. See Berys Gaut, "Art and Knowledge," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 439–40; Berys Gaut, *Art, Emotion and Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 172; Gordon Graham, *Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 41; Eileen John, "Art and

Knowledge," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (New York: Routledge, 2001), 329; Matthew Kieran, "Value of Art," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (New York: Routledge, 2001), 215–16, 222; Peter Lamarque, *The Philosophy of Literature* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), chap. 7, "Value"; Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Cognitive Triviality of Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 32.3 (1992): 191–200.

3. See Noël Carroll, "Art, Narrative, and Emotion," in *Emotion and the Arts*, ed. Mette Hjorte and Sue Laver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 192–95; Gordon Graham, "Aesthetic Cognitivism and the Literary Arts," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 30.1 (1996): 1–17; Kieran, "Value of Art," 222; Peter Kivy, *Philosophies of Arts: An Essay in Differences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 90–91; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 248–85; Jenefer Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 2005), 105–8, 154–55, 195–96.

4. Christopher Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3–5, 12, 48–50, 202–12.

5. See, e.g., Carroll, "Art, Narrative, and Emotion," 192–95; Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*, 245–285; Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, 105–8, 154–55, 195–96.

6. See note 5 above.

7. Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*, 7, 245–85; cf. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 4–5, 39, 52, 91, 96, 202. Of course, many philosophical treatises do address us on an emotional level. For instance, Berys Gaut argues that passages in Bernard Williams's work, especially the thought-experiment involving Jim and Pedro set forth in "A Critique of Utilitarianism," fit this description (*Art, Emotion and Ethics*, 160–64). Nussbaum could respond, however, that such texts are not purely academic in nature. They possess literary or artistic properties. It is these properties that arouse our emotions.

8. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Kenneth Winkler (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), bk. 3, chap. 10, sec. 34. See also Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), bk. 1, chaps. 4–5.

9. Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*, 245–63; cf. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 4–5, 39.

10. Purely academic writing can arouse our emotions. A case report in a forensics journal of a loved one's murder might make me despondent. A scholarly monograph that plagiarized my work might infuriate me. In these examples, however, my emotional response stems from the *content* and not the *style* of the writing. Thus, such cases are not counterexamples to Nussbaum's claim that literature and poetry are the only *styles* of writing that provoke our emotions.

11. All Nietzsche citations in this article are from Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1989), 1–163.

12. Brian Leiter, "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals*, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 334–57; Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 269–79; cf. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 202–12.

13. Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 272–73; see also Peter Poellner, "Perspectival Truth," in *Nietzsche*, ed. Brian Leiter and John Richardson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 99.

14. Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 130–32.

15. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 208–9. The precise strength of Janaway's claim is unclear. Sometimes he says that our emotions are the *only* things that focus our attention (208–9). At other times he allows that our interests and desires do some of the work (213 n. 21). It is possible to

reconcile these two positions. Janaway could maintain that our interests and desires determine our emotional states, which in turn focus our attention.

16. Isabelle Blanchette and Anne Richards, "The Influence of Affect on Higher Level Cognition: A Review of Research on Interpretation, Judgement, Decision Making and Reasoning," *Cognition and Emotion* 24.4 (2010): 561–95; Barbara L. Fredrickson and Christine Branigan, "Positive Emotions Broaden the Scope of Attention and Thought-Action Repertoires," *Cognition and Emotion* 19.3 (2005): 313–32; Jenny Yiend, "The Effects of Emotion on Attention: A Review of Attentional Processing of Emotional Information," *Cognition and Emotion* 24.1 (2010): 3–47.

17. Carroll, "Art, Narrative, and Emotion," 199–203; Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, 105–35, 154–94. See also Ronald De Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Jesse Prinz, *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

18. Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, 128.

19. For other discussions of this passage, see Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 102–5; Christopher Janaway, "Responses to Commentators," *European Journal of Philosophy* 17.1 (2009): 145–48; Stephen Mulhall, "Nietzsche's Style of Address: A Response to Christopher Janaway's *Beyond Selflessness*," *European Journal of Philosophy* 17.1 (2009): 121–31.

20. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 101.

21. For a similar set of examples, see Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, 108–13.

22. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 4, 48, 212. For other endorsements of the view, see Carroll, "Art, Narrative, and Emotion," 192; Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*, 253, 256; Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, 174. It is worth acknowledging that Janaway backs off the view in question at one point in favor of a more modest position (49).

23. Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, 126–31; Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1994), 212–17.

24. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 12, 40–44.

25. Recent empirical findings support only the weaker claim that people who have trouble expressing emotions *take longer* to process sentences with emotional content. See Arthur M. Glenberg, Bryan J. Webster, Emily Mouilso, David Havas, and Lisa M. Lindeman, "Gender, Emotion, and the Embodiment of Language Comprehension," *Emotion Review* 1.2 (2009): 151–61; David A. Havas, Arthur M. Glenberg, and Mike Rinck, "Emotion Simulation During Language Comprehension," *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review* 14.3 (2007): 436–41; David A. Havas, Arthur M. Glenberg, Karol A. Gutowski, Mark J. Lucarelli, and Richard J. Davidson, "Cosmetic Use of Botulinum Toxin-A Affects Processing of Emotional Language," *Psychological Science* 21.7 (2010): 895–900.

26. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 46–47, 52.

27. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 49–50.

28. See P.J.E. Kail, "Naturalism, Method and Genealogy in *Beyond Selflessness*," *European Journal of Philosophy* 17.1 (2009): 115. Kail notes that the problem in the cases mentioned is not a *lack* of emotions but the *presence* of the wrong emotions. Thus perhaps Nietzsche only needs to help his readers become dispassionate. An academic writing style could accomplish this much. However, Janaway has a response to this objection. For Nietzsche, emotional attachments can only be overcome by replacing them with competing emotional attachments (*D* 109; *BGE* 106). They cannot be removed without putting something in their place. In other words, there is no such thing as a completely neutral and dispassionate standpoint. Indeed, this is the insight that drives Nietzsche's perspectivism (*Beyond Selflessness*, 210–16).

29. See Ken Gemes, "Janaway on Perspectivism," *European Journal of Philosophy* 17.1 (2009): 105–6; Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 272–73.

30. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 96, 209, 212. For another attempt at the same general strategy, see Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*, 261–69.
31. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 11–12, 49–50, 209.
32. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 12, 17–18, 48–53, 209.
33. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 49, 53, 96.
34. Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 46, emphasis added.
35. See Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, 127.
36. See Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 49, 53, 96.